Enforceability questions related to international environmental agreements from game theoretic aspects

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Orsolya Szendrey
Andrea Karcagi-Kováts

Abstract

Rockstörm and his colleges consider global warming as the third most serious ecological problem, meanwhile human population mainly perceives the its effects through climate change. Ensuring the sustainable development, creating long-lasting, viable environmental conditions poses serious challenges to leading world’s decision-makers and requires the adoption and globan acceptance of conservation measures that cannot be imagined without the strategic cooperation of economies. For these reasons, in our paper, we mainly examine the structure, the success and enforceability of international environmental agreements with special attention to treaties related to climate change.
Our aim is to determine the principles and conditions which can make international environmental agreements acceptable and enforceable for all the participants. We also show two detailed examples to illustrate the success and failure of environmental agreements (e.g. Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Agreement). After considering the main principles of international environmental agreements, we use different game theoretic models to describe countries strategic behaviour during the climate change negotiations.

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How to Cite
Szendrey, Orsolya, and Andrea Karcagi-Kováts. 2019. “Enforceability Questions Related to International Environmental Agreements from Game Theoretic Aspects”. TAYLOR 10 (3):67-78. https://iskolakultura.hu/index.php/taylor/article/view/32042.
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