Introduction: Argument, Scope, Aims, Questions, And Outline of The Study

There were four factors that gave the Truman administration an important role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) the new geopolitical sphere resulting from World War II, which gave the US unprecedented power in influencing foreign policies; (2) the role of American public opinion, constituting American media, government officials and influential groups; (3) American economic interests in Arab oil and; (4) remarkable racial ideologies as changes in the perceptions of European Jews, combined with negative Arab perceptions, influenced Americans to become pro-Zionist. These combined issues created the environment in which Harry S. Truman adopted his Palestine-Israeli policy (Gartner 2001). Additionally, Truman’s distrust of State Department officials gave his political advisors, David Niles and Clark Clifford, the opportunity to persuade him that it would be beneficial for US interests to have a Zionist ally in the Middle East, that US relations with Arab nations would not be ruined, and that the migration of the Jewish people to Palestine would not lead to a conflict in the Middle East (McBride 2005). But that has not been really, Arab-Israeli conflict over the land of Palestine has been the biggest obstacle to the Middle East’s stability during the last eight decades.

On one hand, some scholars argue that Truman’s policy toward the Palestine Question was shaped by domestic political pressures. They argued that American Jews, together with many pro-Zionist groups, pressed the Truman administration to sincerely support the Jews in Palestine and to ignore Arab Palestinians (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007; Mearsheimer 2001; Snetsinger 1974; Ottolenghi 2004; Dinnerstein 1982). This is a powerful allegation and it bears a large deal of weight in the presidency relationship with the Middle East today. However, other scholars record that President Harry S. Truman and his top advisors, Clark Clifford and Dean Acheson, completely denied that the administration’s attitude towards the Palestine issue was dictated by domestic political concerns and demands (Truman 1965, 158–90; Clifford and Holbrooke 1991; Acheson 1969, 169,176). O Even though many of the Congress members enthusiastically pressed the administration during that period to create an independent state of Jews in Palestine by sending many congressional letters and petitions attest, but their pressure was not the main cause of Truman’s foreign policy towards Palestine Question.

On the other hand, some other researchers argue that during his work as the American president, Truman’s attitude toward the Palestine Question influenced mainly by his humanitarian principles Radosh and Radosh 2010; Davidson 2010, 38,39; Robins 2017). Michael T Benson, for example, claimed that Truman’s attitude towards the Palestine Question was mostly influenced by his humanitarian nature. He believed there was “something profound and meaningful in the Jewish restoration to Palestine that transcended other considerations” (Benson 1997, x). Scholars who address the role of religion in Truman’s policy towards the Palestine Question have tended to fall in line with the humanitarian interpretation, seeking to illustrate Truman’s policy apart from narrow political concerns. Such scholars believe that the president was guided by his humanitarian and Christian views and was willing to adopt tough decisions regarding the Palestine Question (Merkley 2004, ix; Smith 2015, 256; Anderson 2005, 89).

As shall be demonstrated in this paper, if domestic political demands had been the only concern for President Truman, then researchers could expect to find most of the president’s communications in favor of Israel, without concern of Palestinians. While, if humanitarian principles had been the concern of Truman’s policy towards the Palestine Question, then scholars could expect to find a balance in the president’s communications between Arabs and Jews and his humanitarian nature should have been offered for both Arab and Jewish refugees. Humanitarian efforts could not be towards only one of the conflict’s parties.

Therefore, did President Truman ignore Palestinians in his communications? Did he use humanitarian principles only towards Jews? If we could find evidenced answers for these questions, then we shall ask, why Harry Truman would have reacted in this fashion. Was it political motivations? Or was it humanitarian principles? Thus, this essay seeks to clarify how Palestine-Israel related references were represented in the documents of President Truman by adopting a methodological approach that has found in studies of diplomatic history and that Michael Hogan and others have called the ‘realist’ approach to the history of foreign policy (Hogan and Paterson 1991). This approach is superior for understanding the politics of containment, deterrence, alliances, wars, and crises (Holsti 2004). This study uses the ‘realist’ approach to find out how Palestine and Israel were presented in the documents of President Harry S. Truman during his work as the US president from April 12, 1945 to January 20, 1953.

This paper reconciles the different historiographies and archives involved by using Arab, Israeli and American sources. It utilizes the documents from The American Presidency Project, the Foreign Relations of the US series (FRUS) printed by the Department of State, as well as Truman’s Memoirs. These documents and records give a clear picture of much of the reasoning that shaped Truman’s policy in the Palestine Question. Thus, they help to determine the reasoning behind Truman’s policy towards the issue.

Following this introduction (Section 1), Section 2 introduces the historiography of the primary authors associated with this topic, as well as the difference that existed between the State Department and the White House with regard to the Palestine Question. Section 3 discusses the findings and provides an overall analysis of the collected data from President Truman’s statements regarding the Palestine Question. Finally, Section 4 gives an overall summary of the findings and results.

A Brief history of the Palestine Question

Prior to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’ fourth term, the US had no defined foreign policy toward the Palestine Question. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the US, similar to most countries, was stained by the specter of intense nativism and anti-Semitism (Wilson 1973). A backlash toward foreigners and migrants swelled amongst the public following the rapid rise in migration to the US after World War I, which led to an enforcement of immigration restrictions, particularly from Eastern and Southern European nations. For Jewish refugees, moving to the US would become an almost insurmountable obstacle (Radosh and Radosh 2010). The US regarded the Palestine issue primarily as the responsibility of the United Kingdom (UK). President Roosevelt had been postponing policies and decisions regarding Jewish resettlement and American support for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine (Davidson 2010). Despite his promises to Jewish leaders, Roosevelt had pursued a position that tried to accommodate both the Jews and the Arabs simultaneously. His selected technique was to assure representatives of all groups, which gave a sense of false hope that he shared their agenda. For instance, in a letter that President Roosevelt sent to Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia on May 26, 1943, he assured that no polices or decisions regarding the Palestine issue would be taken “without full consultation with both Arabs and Je: s.” That letter immediately became the cornerstone of the US’s position toward Palestine for the next several years (Wilson 1973, 37–38). Meanwhile, Roosevelt had given assurances to Jewish leaders that after the war ended, Britain was going to allow Jews to go to Palestine without restrictions (Celler 1953). On 20 January 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was sworn in as the US’s top executive officer after defeating Republican Thomas E. Dewey. Roosevelt became the first man to be inaugurated for a fourth term as the US president. At that time, the full scope of World War II’s horrific death toll and refugee crisis were yet to be clearly revealed. Experts would eventually estimate that over 36.5 million people in Europe died as a result of the war, 19 million of whom being civilians, including Jews (Judt 2006). Additionally, there were 30 million displaced Europeans (Kulischer 1948, 305; Vernant 1953, 30; Marrus 1985, 297). Following World War II there were about 330,000 Jewish refugees awaiting relocation in refugee camps (Gartner 2001).

The policies of the US in the Middle East reflected the shift from diplomatic policy to containment (Kuniholm 2014). Within the American federal government, there were two different opinions over Palestinian land. The first position was adopted by Truman’s closest advisors in the White House, Clark Clifford and David Niles, both of whom were strongly pro-Zionist and they promoted the idea of a Jewish nation in Palestine with the support of the US (Sykes 1973). On the other hand, the State Department’s position landed on the opposite side of the spectrum and promoted the idea of the US not being involved in the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Ganin 1978). A consensus emerged in both State Department and White House documents on the critical objectives of the US agenda in Palestine. These objectives included a refusal to deploy American troops in Palestine and an emphasis on denying the area to the Soviets (Ottolenghi 2004). In fact, during that time of the Cold War and the American-Soviet tension, the Middle East region was a strongpoint area to be defended. New nations in the Middle East were under threat from the Soviet Union.

President Truman personally had a pre-presidency attitude toward the Palestine Question, delivering his first public support on behalf of the Jewish refugee settlement in Palestine on 25 May 1939, only several days after Britain declared the White Paper. An article appeared in The Washington Post newspaper with the provocative title, “British Surrender—A Munich for the Holy Land.” Truman added in his attachment that Britain’s leader “has made a scrap of paper out of Lord Balfour’s promise to the Jews,” which amounted to nothing less than another addition “to the long list of surrenders to the axis powers” (Cohen 1990, 44–45). Two years after that article’s publication, Truman joined the American Palestine Committee, a pro-Zionist lobby. Senator Harry S. Truman also joined 68 other senators, known as “the Wagner Group,” in adopting and signing a petition that called for “every possible encouragement to the movement for the restoration of the Jews in Palestine” and seconded a 1922 congressional ruling stating that it was the objective of the US to establish a national home for all Jews in Palestine (Radosh and Radosh 2010, 48–50). Furthermore, before the end of 1942, Truman signed a statement supporting a Jewish army project (Ottolenghi 2004). Later, when President Roosevelt suffered from a cerebral hemorrhage and died on April 12, 1945, Vice President Harry Truman constitutionally became the thirty-second President of the United States. The Jewish Agency’s Political Department issued a statement immediately to its members, stating that Harry S. Truman had signed important declarations relating to the creation of a home nation for the Jews in Palestine. It was optimistic that the Jews had a reliable friend in the White House (Rehovoth 1945). Some days later, the Zionist leaders had their first meeting with Truman, but he surprisingly told them that he would follow the policies and positions laid down by the late President Roosevelt regarding the Palestine Question (Radosh and Radosh 2010, 55). Truman was new at the office and had to deal with all circumstances and complex issues including the Palestine Question which had been one of the complected issues on the table of Roosevelt. Roosevelt himself could not announce a clear plan of the Palestine Question, and it was Truman’s task to act.

However, after World War II, Americans began to view the Jewish people more favorably. While this image underwent a significant positive transformation, the Arab people, including Palestinians, remained negatively depicted (Christison 2001). Additionally, ideological links between Jews and Westerners helped shape American public opinion to be in favor of Zionists, which led to strengthened American government support for the group. Jews worldwide acted to bring about changes in American consciousness and opinions to convince the world, particularly Americans, of Jewish superiority over the Arabs in Palestine. Yet the dominant Arab population in Palestine provided a critical obstacle concerning statehood. To create a Jewish nation in the territory of Palestine would be quite harmful to the Palestinians who had lived there for over 2,000 years, whom were deserving of their own nation. Consequently, the Zionist leaders had shifted the focus from a question of a natural rule to a justification in which Jews could use the Holocaust experience to rationalize their extreme needs. This justification had a powerful effect and was strengthened through Biblical claims of their right to return to the Middle East (McBride 2005). The following section of this study shows how and in which way the two sides of the conflict, Palestinians and Israelis, were presented in the documents of Truman.

Findings and Discussion: The Palestine Question In Truman’s Records

It is fundamental to note that before the creation of the Israeli state, Truman’s consideration of the Palestine issue was intensely influenced by two of his closest assistants, Clark Clifford and David Niles, both of whom were strongly pro-Zionist (Mart 2000; Wilson 1979). Both Congressional and American public attitudes were strongly opposed to resettling the displaced Jews in the United States because of the spread of Communism and economic fears, which resulted in a nativist backlash throughout the US. Post-war Communist panic not only led to McCarthyism, but also contributed to strengthening the nativist barriers that opposed Jewish refugees (Snetsinger 1974). Truman could not alter these fears and sentiments, so he consequently focused his efforts on pressuring Britain to allow Jewish refugees into Palestine (McBride 2005). During the Truman administration, Britain, which was controlling Palestine, faced pressures from the US in order to open Palestine for Jewish refugees. It is thereby apparent that the US’s role in ensuring that Palestine would be the new home for Jews was prominent

The first issue of concern between President Truman and Palestine was that of the displaced Jewish people in Europe in 1945 (see Table 1). The problem was clarified by Earl G. Harrison’s report, who was the head of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (Davidson 2010). Released on 24 August 1945, the report noted that most of the displaced Jewish people in Europe wanted to emigrate to Palestinian land and recommended an immediate evacuation of all Jews in Austria and Germany to Palestine (Ottolenghi 2004, 968). On 16 August 1945, President Truman stated his intention regarding Palestine in a news conference: "The American view of Palestine is we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up there they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis" (Truman 1945a). On 18 October 1945, also during a news conference, he responded to a question about his communication with Prime Minister of the UK, Mr. Attlee, regarding the Palestine Question stating, "I asked him to admit a hundred thousand Jews into Palestine" (Truman 1945b). It is obvious that President Truman was persuaded by Harrison’s report, which prompted him to send a copy to Mr. Attlee, requesting a quick easing of restrictions on European Jewish immigration to Palestine. This communication led to the creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Palestine issue in December 1945, with the main goal of examining the economic, social and political conditions in Palestine in order to solve the problem of Jewish immigration (Davidson 2010; McBride 2005). Hence, on 13 November 1945, Truman stated, "During the course of subsequent discussions between the two Governments [UK & US], it suggested the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry … to make a further review of the Palestine problem" (Truman 1945c). The Anglo-American Committee released its report on 20 April 1946. The report asked for the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine (Cohen 1990, 127). Henceforth, President Truman insisted on the UK government to be cooperative in the matter of sending Jews to Palestine (Grossman and Kirschener 1998; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). That was clear in his letter to Attlee concerning the need for resettlement of Jewish refugees in Palestine on 13 November 1945, in a news conference on 14 June 1946, in his meeting with leaders of the Jewish Agency for Palestine on 2 July 1946 (FRUS 1946) and in his statement on receiving the report of the Anglo-American Committee on 30 April 1946, he stated " I AM VERY HAPPY that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry … I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939 including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish National Home” (Truman 1946a). That means the matter of sending Jews to Palestine was essential for Truman, he insisted on the UK to support him in that initiative. At that time, President Truman worked hard to find a resolution to World War II’s horrific death toll and refugee crisis among Jews, there were about 330,000 Jewish refugees awaiting relocation in refugee camps (Gartner 2001). That position of President Truman could be interpreted as he did not want more Jews in the United States, and that why he struggled to send them somewhere else. He found that Palestine is suitable for his intention because Palestine already had Jews community and the new existed Arab nations were too fragile to defend his ambition.

There was undoubtedly a political motive in every action regarding Palestine, as political and electoral considerations were important to Truman in addition to his genuine concern for the plight of Jewish refugees (Ganin 1978). Truman was under extreme political pressure to act in favor of the Jewish people in the hope of gaining political benefits. Truman found himself in an unprecedented situation as he had to consider the electoral influence of the Jewish vote in the US (Ottolenghi 2004; Snetsinger 1974). Leonard Dinnerstein’s research found that the Jewish lobby did not exist in the US until after World War II, then became coveted by both parties in the country (Dinnerstein 1982, 36–37). While Jewish voters represented a disciplined voting barrier in many key Electoral College states that could be fundamental in close elections, including New York, there was no disciplined Arab voting barrier in the US. Therefore, political parties could focus on appealing to American-Jewish voters without considering the adverse effect of the Arab vote (Feis 1969). Along with the strength of the Jewish lobby, many American politicians supported the Zionist project in Palestine, such as New York Democratic Senator Robert Wagner, Ohio Republican Senator Robert Taft and Congressman Emmanuel Celler (Snetsinger 1974). Just a few days after becoming President, Wagner asked Truman to open Palestinian territory for Jewish refugees and Wagner was soon able to get support from 250 members of the House of Representatives and 54 Senators in favor of Jewish refugees (Sachar 2007). On 23 July 1945 Truman also received a request from Celler to make Palestine available to Jewish refugees (McBride 2005, 32–33).

Consequently, Truman supported a conference held in London between the British Government and Jewish and Arab representatives on 16 August 1946 (Wilson 1973). During this conference, he stated "It is the sincere hope of the President, however, that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine can be found and immediate steps can be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe" (Truman 1946b). Later that same year, Truman commented on 4 October 1946 stating, "In view of the fact that winter will come on before the Conference can be resumed, I believe and urge that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should begin at once" (Truman 1946c). He also wrote a message to the King of Saudi Arabia concerning Palestine on 28 October 1946 stating: "The Government and people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War" (Truman 1946d). At this point, a Partition solution took center stage in American policy debates as the UK handed over the Palestine issue to the United Nations starting from February 1947. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established in order to address the matter. The State Department highly opposed a partition solution, suggesting it was not logical and against US foreign interests (Mart 2000; Wilson 1979). That suggestion was described as a recipe for war and if the US would support partition, it would lead to long-term Arab hostility. Secretary Marshall eventually said to Warren Austin, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the United States should not make any public statement about the Truman administration’s position about the future of Palestine at all. If and when the United States adopted a strategy, it would have to be based on an examination of the entire situation and a way that America could defend the world, now and in the future (Radosh and Radosh 2010). Meanwhile, Truman focused mainly on his 1948 campaign for presidency and found it politically better to align his stance with the Jewish position, and therefore supported a partition resolution. He knew that he had got the office because of President Roosevelt’s death and at that time, he was seeking to get elected by Americans for the first time as a US president.

Nevertheless, Truman continued to hope that UNSCOP’s recommended plan could avoid bloodshed and avert the sending of the US military to the Middle East (Christison 2001). In a special message to Congress transmitting the annual report on US participation in the United Nations on 20 February 1948, President Truman stated "the United Nations is acting to place the question of Palestine on the way to settlement on the basis of two independent states, one Arab and one Jewish" (Truman 1948a). In a news conference held on 25 March 1948 Truman stated, "Unfortunately, it has become clear that the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as a matter of national policy" (Truman 1948b). He rejected the idea of sending US troops to Palestine (Snetsinger 1974) on 22 April 1948, clarifying "We offered to furnish our share of a United Nations police force. That is the only way we will send troops anywhere under the United Nations" (Truman 1948c). Additionally, Truman confirmed to find a peaceful solution in Palestine on 6 May 1948 (Davidson 2010), where, he stated "We are doing everything we possibly can to prevent bloodshed, and are trying to get the Palestine matter settled on a peaceable basis" (Truman 1948d). The United Nations mandated that both the Arabs and Jews could appoint two liaison officers to UNSCOP. Though the Arabs declined, the Jewish Agency appointed the Jewish Agency’s chief economist, David Horowitz, and a thirty-two-year-old British Zionist, Aubrey (Eban), who were given instructions to work for the creation of a Jewish state in a suitable area of Palestine. The UNSCOP report was announced on 31 August 1947, which presented two plans, a majority report and a minority report. The majority report proposed the creation of Arab and Jewish states, which would become independent after a two-year transitional period, during which time the United Nations would supervise the Mandate under a trusteeship. The two states would have an economic union. In addition, 150,000 immigrants would be allowed to move to Palestine, and Jerusalem would be established as an international zone. Seven of the members—Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay—supported this plan. Three member states—India, Iran, and Yugoslavia—voted for the minority report, which called for a federal state to be created within three years, of which the Arab and Jewish states would become provinces with a common capital in Jerusalem. The Australian delegate abstained from supporting either plan (Radosh and Radosh 2010; Davidson 2010; Benson 1997). This resulted in disagreements, where the Arabs had rejected any intention of partition on the justification that they held the vast majority of the Palestinian population and demanded the right of the entire nation and self-determination. The Jewish people coveted all of Palestine as well, but accepted the partition notion as the first step toward gaining their goal (Ottolenghi 2004; Cohen 1990).

Following the partition dispute, a civil war started over Palestine and the Mandatory authority made it clear that it could in no way assist in the enforcement of a two-state solution (McBride 2005; Grossman and Kirschener 1998). 15 May 1948 was chosen by the UK as the final day of the Mandate, although violence continued. It was a reality that a potential power vacuum would follow the end of the mandate over Palestine (Ganin 1978). Therefore, both the State Department and the White House consensually decided to re-evaluate the situation. President Truman set to consider the recognition of Israel, which was a backroom deal between President Truman and the Jewish Agency leader, Chaim Weizmann, who was soon to be president of the new state (Snetsinger 1974; Grossman and Kirschener 1998). Arguments in favor of Israel’s recognition were framed within the scope of US interests in the Middle East. Truman did not make his final decision until between 12 and 14 of May 1948 (Wilson 1979; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Recognition of Israel was one of the main demands of the American Zionists lobby, along with other requests, such as the abolition of the arms embargo (McBride 2005). Ultimately, on 14 May 1948 President Truman announced the de facto recognition of the State of Israel (Ganin 1978) and stated, "The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel" (Truman 1948e). President Truman evidently did not see Israel’s recognition as antithetical to truce negotiations within the United Nations and also did not inform the US mission about his recognition (Radosh and Radosh 2010; Sachar 2007). On 10 June 1948, he declared his satisfaction for the truce, which was signed between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and on 22 June 1948, he announced that an agreement was reached between the US and Israel in order to exchange diplomatic missions. Furthermore, on 26 October 1948, in informal remarks in Indiana and Ohio, Truman recognized that when he was in Potsdam in 1945, he visited Jewish camps and had suggested sending them to Palestine (Truman 1965; Stewart 2015). On 28 October 1948, in his address in New York City, Truman stated “it is my desire to help build in Palestine a strong, prosperous, free, and independent democratic state” (Truman 1948f). For Israelis, de facto recognition was not fully satisfactory and it did not reduce political pressure on Truman, as letters and requests poured in to urge him to a full de jure recognition of the Israeli state, as well as the abolition of the arms embargo to Israel (Sachar 2007; Feis 1969). Therefore, on 31 January 1949, President Truman announced the full recognition of Israel (Wilson 1979; Benson 1997), which stated “The President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel, it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on January 25th … The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to the Government of Israel as of this date” (Truman 1949). In May 1949, one year after American recognition of the new Jewish state, Israel got full membership in the United Nations and Truman reinforced Israel through a $100 million loan (Radosh and Radosh 2010). In the aftermath, Israel has kept its place as the most reliable partner of the United States in the Middle East. The United States announced explicitly several times that Israel’s security means US security. The new state of Jews has received US economic and political support at all levels.

After the recognition of the Israeli state, President Truman showed support in a variety of ways, one of which was the peace process between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries. For example, on 24 February 1949, Truman expressed his hope for more peace agreements between Israel and Arab countries after a formal armistice was agreed upon between Egypt and Israel and on 25 May 1950, he then announced a joint declaration with the UK and France regarding their efforts in Arab-Israel peace processes (see Table 1). Another aspect was Israel’s economic and infrastructural development. This was exemplified on 19 May 1949, when Truman declared Proclamation Number 2839, which was entitled “Israel: Suspension of Tonnage Duties”, and on 6 March 1952, Truman stated “We can help build roads and establish public health services in Israel” (Truman 1952a). Further, on 26 May 1952 in an address at a Jewish National Fund dinner, President Truman stated that “The growth and progress of the new State of Israel are a source of great satisfaction to me. I had faith in Israel even before it was established” (Truman 1952b). In the first national conference regarding Israel on 21 September 1951, President Truman received a book from former U.S. Ambassador to Israel, James G. McDonald, as well as a plaque for his assistance to the State of Israel. Additionally, on 25 October 1951, he received the 1951 Histadrut Humanitarian Award of the National Committee for Labor Israel (Benson 1997; Ganin 1978; Truman 1965). As exemplified through his documents, President Truman was always proud of his work toward Israel, e.g. as evidenced in his address on 17 October 1952, which stated “I am proud of my part in the creation of this new state. Our Government was the first to recognize the State of Israel" and in his Farewell Address to the American People on 15 January 1953 he said, "Israel can be made the country of milk and honey as it was in the time of Joshua” (Truman 1952c). Hence, there have been several interpretations of Truman’s bias towards the Jews. Most insist that President Truman did so in order to bolster his flagging political standing in the election. Some have argued that Truman did not wish to support Israel but that he was convinced by his aides that he should do so. Some have argued that he did it for religious reasons. Others believe it was for humanitarian reasons. Fear of the Soviets supporting Israel first is another way of explaining Truman’s position. But it was obvious, Truman had more than one reason for recognizing Israel (Stewart 2015).

As a consequence of Israel’s creation, there was a large number of displaced Palestinians (Christison 2001). Therefore, Truman said in a statement on 7 December 1948 that "following adoption by the United Nations General Assembly on November 19 of a resolution for assistance to Palestine refugees, will recommend to Congress that the United States contribute 50 percent of the amount provided for in this resolution"(Truman 1948g). Starting from mid-1948, President Truman mentioned relief programs for Palestinian refugees several times in his communications (Truman 1965; Stewart 2015). In other words, his mentions of Palestine and Palestinians only existed regarding the topic of refugee relief. These mentions can be noted on 24 March 1949, on 30 December 1949, on 30 January 1950 and on 5 January 1950 (see Table 1). On 27 July 1951, President Truman wrote in his letter to Committee Chairmen on financing the United Nations Palestine refugee program that "The Mutual Security Program now before Congress includes a request of $50,000,000 for the United States contribution to this program in the fiscal year 1952" (Truman 1951). Therefore, it is logical to say, in line with to David Niles, that if Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived and Harry S. Truman had not been his successor, there might not be an existence of the Israeli state (Radosh and Radosh 2010, 354). For instance, if Roosevelt had been the US president, the assistance at critical historical events would not have happened. Without Truman, the newborn Israel would not have survived its early complicated period and succeeded thereafter.

In New York at the Jewish Theological Seminary, when Eddie Jacobson told one of the attendees that he was going to introduce the person who helped create the Israeli independent state, Truman quickly responded, “Helped create Israel? I am Cyrus, I am Cyrus” (Robins 2017, 14). Through President Truman’s found documents, it is noticeable that he fully ignored Arab-Palestinians issues, focusing only on Jewish issues and most of his efforts and promises regarding the Palestine Question were made before the 1948 presidential election.

Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction, during the last few decades, most of the studies regarding Truman’s attitude towards the Palestine Question have continued to fall significantly on one of the two interpretations clarified by Michael Cohen. There are two schools regarding Truman’s position with regard to Palestine. The White House school argued that President Truman supported Jews in Palestine due to his humanitarian concerns. While the State Department school argued that Truman’s actions concerning Palestine were because of his narrow political interest in the Jewish vote.

Domestic concerns have always been critical in affecting American presidents’ foreign policy. In the Palestine matter, domestic influences and interests took many forms. President Truman gave consideration to the 1948 presidential election when concluding his position on Palestine; few politicians would have acted otherwise. Domestic considerations also included the remarkable increase in American prejudices and nativist sentiments.

The data shown in Table 1 demonstrates how Truman conceptualized the region. He certainly had a Bible-inspired understanding of the region and he sometimes cited the Bible as history. As that says something about his view of the region, he seems to have had a racialized view of Jews and the people of the region. Jews could improve the region and the absence of comments on Arab abilities along these lines is alluding that the Arabs could not. Truman is part of a tradition of erasing the Palestinians from existence by merely not mentioning them or prioritizing other people over them. If President Truman was concerned only about humanitarian principles, why did not he use these principles towards Palestinians who were deported to neighboring countries? Why did he abandon the UN resolution of the two-state and immediately recognize the state of Israel? And, most importantly, why did he announce the recognition of Israel just before the 1948 election? This also leads to some further questions: Was Truman anti-Semitic? Did he personally not want more Jews in the United States?

Lastly, this paper could conclude by underlining that Truman was able to claim brilliant justification on humanitarian principles for having helped the Jewish people and, using this cause, sought to gain many political advantages for himself and for his party. Truman claimed that he wanted to help displaced Jewish people in Europe, but eventually the creation of Israel and the subsequent Palestinian-Israeli conflict led to millions of displaced Palestinians into the neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and even European countries.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary of Palestine-Israel related attitudes identified in the records of President Truman.

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