Return to Article Details Deciphering Donald Trump with Mannheim (via Hayden White) and Bobbio: A Peculiar Ideological Interpretation

Donald Trump, peculiarly on a left-right ideological axis

Donald Trump was one of the most extraordinary presidents in mostly extraordinary times. His overall flamboyant and erratic style in carrying out the duties of presidential administration continuously generated bewilderment and miscalculations, indecisiveness and perspectivism, ultimately in regard to accurate assessments and representations of his views and actions. The difficulties stemming from exploring and assessing the inherent discontinuities and contradictions specific to Trump’s personality, views and actions and the endeavor to understand his rise and political conduct stimulate – among other renderings – genuine ideological interpretations. Moreover, these could stand for brand-new tests in search of relevance and validity of ideological thinking and/ or renewed investigations on ideological veracity in confronting the very unconventional challenge prompted by such a political personality and presidential administration. Leaving aside the far-reaching controversies concerning president Trump’s proper ideological views, a great deal of recent scholarly literature has labeled and explained Trump’s overall strategies and behavior by using ideological references. A plethora of ideological assessments have become more or less elucidatory in regard to Trump’s views and actions, of which capitalist authoritarianism, nationalist capitalism, sovereigntist nativism, alt-right conservatism and populism still remain consequential. Even if both partisan and dispassionate ideological analyses have highly contributed to a comprehensive understanding of Trump’s views and actions, more knowledgeable and ‘finely-tuned’ interpretations might be achieved.

The present endeavor purports to reflect upon previous results in search of the above-mentioned ‘fine ideological tuning’. To that end, it would be tantamount to discovering, identifying and more accurately locating Donald Trump’s ideological underpinnings related to his beliefs and policy management through a distinct, albeit peculiar, interpretation and contextualization within the structure and meanings of ideological leanings in present-day American politics. Guiding and illuminating methodological tools in the pivotal works of Karl Mannheim, Hayden White’s interpretation of Mannheim, and Norberto Bobbio become catalysts for this attempt. A disciple of Max Weber’s theory of rationality and objectivity in social sciences (Kettler, Loader and Meja 2008), Karl Mannheim astutely noted that "the greater art of the sociologist consists in his attempt always to relate changes in mental attitudes to changes in social situations" (Mannheim 1953, 219). For Mannheim, ideologies are "discoverable structures of mentality as they were to be found in living individual human beings" (Mannheim 1954, 189), so that the main focus of investigation in his Ideology and Utopia was an ingenious type of intellectual quest for utopian frameworks of the modern mind. In the 1930s – when the first edition of his famous work was printed – Mannheim (1954) identified four categories of utopian guiding ideas: Chiliasm, liberal-humanitarianism, conservatism and social-communism. In the 1970s, for the purpose of his study on nineteenth-century historical imagination, Hayden White properly converted Manheim’s utopian categories into "ideological preferences" (White 1973, 22-26), in keeping with Mannheim’s most intimate belief that structures of the mind should mirror present social and political contexts. Accordingly, White welcomed ideological anarchism as the historically accurate instantiation of the idealistic and revolutionary Chiliastic attitude of Anabaptists in Mannheim (1954), replaced Mannheim’s anachronistic utopia of social-communism with radicalism, and preserved the liberal and conservative ideas as suitable to his methodological narrativism (White 1973). Further details about the intellectual ruminations of both Mannheim and White would further complicate the methodological justifications of the present approach. At this point, for the scope of this interpretation and also considering the referential historical context of the investigation, it is probably suggestive to maintain White’s ideological bearings of anarchism, liberalism and conservatism, and remove radicalism as inconclusive, since one can perceive radicalism as an astringent characteristic of any political ideology and not as an ideology per se. As a substitute for radicalism, fascism might take a more consistent explanatory stance when it comes to seizing ubiquitous structures of the ideological mind within the present context characterizing social and political realities in the United States, even if both Mannheim (1954) and White (1973) were bent on considering anarchism and fascism as types of Romantic outcomes plainly consistent with the Chiliastic utopian attitude.

Italian political scientist Norberto Bobbio achieved a breakthrough by further refining the resulting ideological axis and making it more elastic. Acknowledging both the diversity of ideological predispositions and affinities within a theoretical environment not liable to ideological taxonomy and of ideological oversimplifications in coping with complex political issues, Bobbio claimed that certain ‘stubborn’ ideological affiliations and strong beliefs could not be denied. In the opening remarks of one of his most popular works, Bobbio equated the rejection of "dyadic thought" (1996, 5) in politics with the very crisis of ideologies, in the same way in which – more than half a century before – Karl Mannheim (1934) had understood the reluctance of studying ideological attitudes as a sign of a deep cultural crisis – a crisis of rationality and communication leading to stress and disorientation. In other words, both Mannheim and Bobbio maintained that the examination of genuine ideological identifications would be consistent with maintaining the dyadic thought in terms of clear-cut ideological oppositions between left and right. Norberto Bobbio’s ideological axis did not explicitly include proper ideological designations for those individuals or groups adhering to either the extreme left or the extreme right, but specifically associated the existence of dyadic ideological thinking with the postulation of the principle of the excluded middle (an either, or type of exclusivist ideological identification according to which, on a certain issue, the respective identification is either true or false, a third possibility being excluded) (Bobbio 1996, 5). Even if present-time ideological identities would be incompatible with upholding the excluded middle principle, this would not result in a complete rejection of left-right ideological thinking, but rather in dismissing both outright extremism and utterly uncompromising left and right ideological beliefs. For instance, while holding an intractable radical-left opinion in regard to a specific topic, one could also hold more moderate views on other topics; this simply means that one could claim a predominant leftist orientation and not an intransigent form of ideological extremism. Consequently, in line with Bobbio’s insightful acumen, the key principle to understanding present ideological options is that of the inclusive middle (a both, and type of inclusivist ideological identification): "the synthesis of opposing positions with the intention in practice of saving whatever can be saved of one’s own position by drawing in the opposing position and thus neutralizing it" (Bobbio 1996, 9). In the United States progressive liberals and liberal conservatives epitomize inclusivist ideological thinking. The more inclusive an individual/ group/ party is, the more nuanced and complex the structure of the ideological axis. The inclusive middle type of ideological positioning mitigates rigid extremism and makes the ideological axis more elastic and descriptively accurate when it comes to elucidating various ideological incorporations of more and more diverse political stances on various issues. Moreover, the only possibility of temporarily suspending the left-right ideological thinking along with the possibility of representing various ideological options on a geometrical-type of horizontal axis occurs in the historical context of totalitarianism which forcefully absorbs whatever inopportune ideological propensities individuals, groups and society at large might have. In all non-totalitarian political regimes – the authoritarian ones included – the manifestation of radicals and extremists (either on the left, or on the right) is consistent with marginal political and ideological rancor of individuals and/ or groups that are outweighed by more moderate ideological inclusivists (both on the left and on the right).

The postulation of the ideological principle of the included middle (a neither, nor type of disruptive ideological identification) (Bobbio 1996, 7) is the necessary add-on in order to achieve the comprehensiveness of the ideological axis. Considering the historical and political context of Donald Trump’s administration in light of Bobbio’s ruminations juxtaposed to White’s interpretation of Mannheim, the main options on the presumptive ideological axis – from left to right – plausibly include the more or less radical anarchism (Antifa, Me Too, Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, LGBTQ, Sanders) that could be situated at the (more or less) extreme left of the axis; the progressive liberals (and liberal social-democrats alike) of the Democratic Party are allotted a (more or less) moderate portion of the axis, according to the inclusive middle ideological positioning on the left; their opponents, on the right wing of moderate, inclusive middle ideological politics, are the liberal conservatives and what has survived out of less moderate right-wing neo-conservatism; finally, at the extreme right of present-day ideological predispositions in the United States, one could locate (more or less) explicitly radical neo-fascist groups and organizations (American Front, Vanguard America, Patriot Front, Qanon). The included middle ideological commitment is too divisive to be compatible with inclusive middle ideological approaches of progressive liberals and liberal conservatives, and too nihilist to persuade both left and right extremist militancy grounded on the principle of exclusive disjunction (either, or, but not both type of ideological identity according to which, on a certain issue, only one ideological posture is true, the other being necessarily false).

Accordingly, Donald Trump’s approach to politics could take on a robust ideological interpretation in line with the meaning of the principle of the included middle: it is precisely this neither, nor ideological attitude that fully explains the former president’s antagonistic, belligerent, unpredictable, and essentially disruptive and divisive stances in American politics. The following analytical investigation of this presupposition purports to explain how former president Trump peculiarly took over on such an atypical ideological bravura. Specifically, the widespread designations of Trumpism, Trumponomics and Trumpology are used as case-in-point allegorical monikers associated with Trump’s included middle ideological outlook in politics.

Trumpism, or the included middle disruptive politics

Trumpism encompasses a complex combination of behavioral traits, predispositions for action, thinking proneness and competitive passions (Weber 1992) which underlined the former US president Donald Trump’s general conduct in both presidential administration and elections. Even if this specific understanding of temperamental Trumpism has animated the recent scientific interest of psychologists and psychiatrists (Lee 2019; Post and Doucette 2019), explaining Donald Trump’s essentially combative, alienating and disruptive general attitude in politics makes room for an ideological interpretation which is also explanatory for his included middle ideological twist. Accounts of his psychological profile have been trumped up by the former president’s self-projection and his followers’ perceptions of the outsider politician: the extraordinary anti-politician, anti-system, businessman, media and independent personality of Donald Trump (Herbert, McCrisken and Wroe 2019). Both as candidate and as president, Trump prepensely overplayed this role, being fully aware of the fact that he had to act within the system. For this reason only, but in keeping with the overall characteristics of his personality, Trump had to consistently claim his own slot on the ideological arena and commit to his duties accordingly. Since he could not follow any ideological status quo, (political) actor Trump expressly took the included middle path, by professing a divisive and disruptive ideological stance in American politics. Upholding enmity politics (Zelizer 2018, 9), ideological Trumpism saw enemies everywhere:

"‘mainstream media (‘fake news’), elections (‘fraudulent’), politicians (‘drain the swamp’), political parties (‘dysfunctional’), public-sector bureaucrats (‘the deep state’), judges (‘enemies of the people’), protests (‘paid rent-a-mob’), intelligence services (‘liars and leakers’), lobbyists (‘corrupt’), intellectuals (‘arrogant liberals’) and scientists (‘who needs experts?’), interest groups (‘get-rich-quick lobbyists’), the constitution (‘a rigged system’), international organizations like the European Union (‘Brussels bureaucrats’) and the UN (‘a talking club’)’." (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 4)

Plainly consistent with the neither, nor orientation of included middle ideological politics, the protocol of Trumpism was informed by "distrust, polarization, negative stereotyping, black-and-white thinking, aggression and demonization" (Spillman and Spillman 1997, 44-63). Consequently, the prevailing rhetorical emphasis on unity of President Biden – during his campaign, inauguration and beyond – has been aimed at overcoming the divisive, intransigent, conspiratorial and antagonistic dominating spirit in American society. More in line with the inclusive middle ideological approach, one of the most challenging tasks of Biden’s administration seems to be about domesticating and softening the intoxication of US citizens with binaries and dichotomies, in addition to eradicating the COVID-19 epidemic crisis, since the eccentric type of included middle Trumpism was solely permeable to like-minded resentful supporters who were dismissive of all the other segments of the electorate.

It seems that the most damaging leftover associated with Trump’s legacy not only points to disruptive politics, but also inflicts upon an acute breach in political communication, mainly generated by conspiratorial Trumpism and Twitterism. Not only did Donald Trump deliberately eschew the traditional, mostly inclusive and guiding channels of public communication, but he also embarked upon a grass-roots approach of political communication, conspicuously by using Twitter (Ouyang and Waterman 2020, 62-66). Targeting both news media trusts and the bureaucratic establishment, Trumpism displayed a suspicious-like and passive-aggressive attitude in communication and overshadowed the impact of rival political messages on already disappointed and angry audiences. The subversive tactics of included middle Trumpism were a perfidious combination of Twitter-style (mis)directing of messages and conspiracism, plainly visible in the ‘birther theory’ directed against former president Obama, the anti-science and anti-expertise discourses especially in regard to anti-COVID 19 vaccines and global warming, the electoral fraud of 2020, the denial of the Russiagate affair, and the fake news plot (Hellinger 2019, 26-30). Trump’s disruptive grip on political communication (Waisbord, Tucker and Lichtenheld 2018, 25-26) is decipherable in his bellicose use of language and interruptive dialogical style (Sclafani 2018, 44), his problematic contacts with teammates in the Republican Party and the take-no-prisoner approach during the two presidential campaigns (Hellinger 2019, 190); probably more damaging than most, his fake-news compulsive agenda assaulted truth as a fungible and good-for-rating asset (McFarlane 2018, 192). Ultimately, language analysis of included middle Trumpism unveils flamboyant, mercurial and bombastic assertiveness, engaging the audience affectively in the mostly entertaining TV-style of statement-applauses transactions, doubled by braggadocious self-promotion and inconsistent, facts-free information transmission (Sclafani 2018, 39).

Properly understood as a mixture of characteristic temperamental predispositions and action habits, Trumpism renders uncertain the fact that the former president took the option of included middle ideological disruptive politics in his full capacities of knowledge and premeditation. To identify Trumpism with a self-conscious approach to alternative right in American politics – utterly based on adopting a shortcut apperception of Trump’s overall background and psychological preferences – would be an underestimation of the possibility to look for more penetrating ideological explanations. Instead of placing him approximately at the extreme right of American politics, as an alternative right-wing militant, authoritarian capitalist and/ or crypto-fascist populist, one could rather confront the dilemma of finding Trumpism as inadequate to any habitual ideological establishment. This is the reason why included middle Trumpism could take on a more elucidatory stance when it comes ideologically locate Donald Trump. Outpacing morality norms, truth conventions and traditional political mythologies (Brooks 2017), Trumpism appalled even the most nonconformist and belligerent neo-conservatives in the Republican Party; some of them excoriated Trumpism as an anachronistic approach to foreign policy (Wright 2016), or denounced it as a fascist predisposition of a "phony billionaire" (Kagan 2016).

Paradoxically enough, while attempting to analytically find Trump’s more or less self-acknowledged topos on the ideological axis of American politics, one might get into the very trouble of facing certain political occurrences characteristic to dystopias (Bauman and Donskis 2016; Giroux 2018), plainly consistent with the included middle ideological identification of disruptive, conspiratorial and vexing Trumpism. Certain perceptions of the past four years in American politics are explanatory for a general atmosphere of discontent, disturbance, deep anxiety and puzzlement characteristically associated with fictional dystopias. Exacerbated by the catastrophic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, the ideological interpretation of Donald Trump’s included middle politics, actions and behaviors might conceal a more frightening stance of dystopian Trumpism. If this is the case, it would rather mean that included middle Trumpism did not reach its strategic and ideological goals, whereby one might find misplaced included middle Trumpism as a more appropriate and lucid ideological explanation. Accordingly, misplaced ideological Trumpism stubbornly resided on the neither, nor uncompromising approach, failing to co-opt further followers and expand its sustainable basin: "he [Trump] managed to coopt only those who supported all his views, instead of persuading those who supported any of his views to embrace all" (Deegan-Krause 2019, 81). Inasmuch as included middle ideological Trumpism is understood as a misplaced strategy of garnering support and as a futile perseverance in perpetual antagonism, the traits of disruptiveness, non-inclusiveness, animosity, anti-establishment, anti-scientism, Twitterism and conspiracism have to be admitted as its most accurate descriptive ingredients.

Trumponomics, or the included middle plutocratic nationalism

If included middle Trumpism points to a fuzzy amalgamation of predisposition traits and temperamental preferences towards certain behaviors, actions and maneuvers, Trumponomics stands for the most identifiable, characteristic and persistent dimension of Donald Trump’s engagement with politics and clear-cut performance in administration. A registered mark of the former president’s tenacious views, Trumponomics encapsulates an adventurous view in political economy, grounded on a distinctive entrepreneurial logic, an ideological agenda of plutocratic nationalism, and a holistic approach with a view to dismantle the false tenets and onerous practices of economic globalization. Analogous to Trumpism, Trumponomics essentially reveals an included middle tactical positioning, with belligerent and divisive agendas of trade wars, crude zero-sum game economics, authoritarian protectionism, mercantilism, rough competitiveness, and ultimately selfish and interest-driven economic goals. Moreover, Donald Trump’s overall conduct in politics mirrors an impervious business-like approach, rendering Trumponomics as its chief rationale and evaluation standard. Side by side, the entrepreneurial logic of Donald Trump, his ideology of plutocratic nationalism and the anti-globalization rhetoric could be analytically effective in explaining the included middle brand of Trumponomics.

Few presidents in the history of the United States followed an inductive approach to political branding and decision-making. It is probably the very landmark of the entrepreneurial logic of Trumponomics to boost itself based on the particularistic business-like personality of Donald Trump. Included middle Trumponomics is nothing more than the follow-up of this bombastic and preeminently instinctual fashion of promoting economic policies as president in office, at the crossroads between his economic jeremiad against costly, risky and onerous partnerships of the United States and Trump’s primarily mercantilist and interest-driven approach to transactionalist, burden-sharing and fair deals economism (Gore 2017; Heydarian 2020; Brands 2018). First and foremost, included middle Trumponomics speaks about this unorthodox management of political compromise and negotiation procedures in the international economic arena, and the unprompted attack on status quo, rationality and precaution, specific to a preeminent "transactional view of international relations" (Ikenberry 2017).

In addition to his substantive entrepreneurial logic, there was a hard-line economic view of the state, justifiable in terms of a particular version of commercial republicanism (Robin 2018; Baluch 2018). Endorsing the economic momentum, the entrepreneurial logic of included middle Trumponomics had to adopt an assertive strand which the former president foxily accommodated to his personalistic view of national capitalism or – as I would rather argue for – plutocratic nationalism. Trump’s plutocratic nationalism epitomizes an ultimately rigid and nativist view on the economy, whose development pillars are constructions, manufacturing, real estate and oil, and which uncovers itself as a US-centered formula of success: produce in the United States, hire US workers, and boost American export (Fuchs 2018; Herbert, McCrisken and Wroe 2019). Since the most effective economic policy achievement of the Trump administration was probably the December 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) to boost big businesses, its overall strategy moved beyond nationalist capitalism, with a view to instate plutocratic nationalism. In this respect, the subtle logic of Trumponomics was that of domesticating unpopular economic inequalities by promoting the mythology of rich and patriotic saviors, and combining it with a populist-like behavior in terms of equality of spirit. In this way, the plutocratic nationalism of Trumponomics was framed to simultaneously outweigh the inclusive middle liberal and conservative strategies of realist power politics, and the internationalist and globalist views of economic power through monetary and capital export policies. Whilst Trump’s nationalism is more markedly populist and cultural-nativist in nature, the iron law of Trumponomics precisely rested on adapting nationalist sentiments, federal bureaucracy and economic policies to plutocratic interests. The former president tried to exploit the nationalist emotions using a populist approach to politics, and dismantled bureaucratic administration through the use of included middle Trumponomics. In order to avoid bureaucratic opposition, the former US president firstly resorted to bureaucratic boycott, bypassing the 1967 anti-nepotism legislation and appointing the closest members of his family to key positions in government (Spitzer 2020). Secondly, certain bureaucratic maneuvers of President Trump revolved around filling important executive positions with wealthy businessmen resulting in "the richest cabinet in history" (Herbert, McCrisken and Wroe 2019, 217).

Probably the most impactful and controversial dimension of included middle Trumponomics should be seized in relation to Trump’s combative rhetoric on globalization. What mostly baffled world political leaders and pundits alike was less connected with his personality-type of entrepreneurial logic or plutocratic nationalism, but more with his blatant obsession for dismantling the current global economic arrangements and his fixation for ordaining the ‘American fortress’ (Brands 2018; Dueck 2021) economic doctrine, tantamount to raising an intractable ‘economic iron curtain’ (Heydarian 2020, 38). In the mind of President Trump, on the one hand, an intransigent vision of economic independence and nationalist authoritarianism in economy would restore America’s dignity and prestige in the world, through ascertaining power in terms of material domestic prosperity in keeping with the ‘America First’ slogan; on the other, fighting the neoliberal agenda of economic globalization was about reversing globalist policies and effectively carrying out unfathomable trade wars. Trump’s battles on miscellaneous trade fronts included both destructions (NAFTA, KORUS, TPP, TTIP) and rearrangements (USMCA, Quad), and the disparagement of the World Trade Organization agenda altogether. Moreover, President Trump’s malediction of trade with China and his initiative of withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement have remained highly (in)famous to this day. Anti-globalization Trumponomics was not only a kind of ‘Copernican revolution’ directed towards the nullification of post-Cold War Washington Consensus grounded on financial stability through the role of International Monetary Fund, development of the Global South with the inputs of World Bank, and free trade arrangements guaranteed by World Trade Organization (Hellinger 2019, 141-142), but also a new perspective on sticky-power politics, based on bilateral – versus multilateral – interests, mutual gains, and fair deals, to the detriment of endless compromises and negotiation processes. Included middle Trumponomics devoted itself to exploiting certain recurrent ideological discontent with globalization dogmas of trade and development, in terms of jobs and industries displacements, income inequalities, environmental propaganda and currency manipulation (Jacoby 2018, 47).

Characteristically, included middle Trumponomics remains a peculiar version of economic protectionism, amalgamating aggressive isolationism, selective bilateralism and neo-multilateralism based on the theory of comparative advantage in economy (Welfens 2019; Jacoby 2018). Above all, through its markedly antagonistic rhetoric and inconsistent policies, included middle Trumponomics ultimately pertains to a "grievance theory" about economy (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 132), intermingling economic protectionism with inherited cultural resentments of economic provenance. Mirroring the pessimistic warning according to which globalist impetuses have generated forms of fundamentalism, communalism and sectionalism (Barber 1996), included middle Trumponomics capitalized on resentments of embittered white Americans who embraced economic nationalism and protectionism, found their atonement in the economic patriotism of American plutocrats, and vented their anger on immigrants and global corporations (McVeigh and Estep 2019, 221-222). For all these reasons, Trumponomics could be peculiarly rendered to the neither, nor specificity of ideological politics.

Trumpology, or the included-middle personalistic strategy of ideological positioning

Understanding included middle Trumpism as a peculiar ideological explanation for a set of predispositions towards egocentric behaviors and actions, congruent with Donald Trump’s personal background and traits of temperament, is indicative of the former president’s overall disruptive conduct in managing all issues associated with his political engagement. In addition, included middle Trumponomics is consistent with ideological plutocratic nationalism as an aftereffect of a peculiar entrepreneurial logic and business-like modus operandi in regard to the economic affairs of the state. But it is probably Trumpology, or the pseudoscientific strategic vision of political management, that could be brought to the fore in order to provide a far-ranging perspective on the very personalistic, interest-driven and goal-directed ideological stances of Donald Trump. Ideologically, included middle Trumpology would not only be consistent with a solipsistic approach to politics, but also with a peculiar sublimation of politics altogether. Self-centered political decisionism, secluded tactical moves, unilateral and interest-driven calculations, and ultimately the ‘America First’ propaganda stand for an energetic personality-type of included middle political action. In a nutshell, five rules seem to work as a diagnosis of included middle Trumpology: "Rule One: Donald Trump does exactly what he wants to do. Rule Two: The law means nothing to Trump. Rule Three: Making money is the most important thing in Trump’s life. Rule Four: The truth is a fungible and expendable commodity. Rule Five: Trump doesn’t care about policy" (Spitzer 2020, 151). This frugal and rather coarse characterization of Trumpology speaks much about a certain parsimonious and hermit-type ideological positioning, reminding of one famous definition of hedgehog personalities who subsume all complexities and nuances to a self-centered singular view (Berlin 1953).

Contrasting all typical traits of comprehensive grand strategies – predictability, bargaining, persuasion, shared interests and winning coalitions (Freedman 2013) – included middle Trumpology is a self-portrait of a peculiarly strategic positioning encapsulating both an interest-driven mindset and a goal-oriented proneness for action. Donald Trump’s strategic views are scornful towards alternative strategic plans, being ultimately accountable to his narcissistic and mercurial personality. Insurgence, bravura, histrionic bent and "acting skills" (Gore 2017) are constitutive for his personal impetuses, informing and commanding upon purportedly strategic considerations. Insofar as strategic thinking points to Freedman’s above-mentioned traits, Donald Trump’s overall vision in and about politics is reduced to self-absorbed hermetics or to a sloppy manner of assuming responsibility and leadership.

The ‘America First’ grandiloquent self-projection of Trumpology is consequential to understanding the defective strategic bearings of Donald Trump. Inasmuch as the slogan as such stands for breaking new ground through propelling the United States of America to a lofty firmament of global politics, it also endorses an included middle ideological insertion into the status quo geopolitical arena. ‘America First’ and its correlative assertion of ‘Make America Great Again’ in the age of Trump were neither the verbalization of tepid isolationism, nor a surrogate of traditional power politics: while straightforward isolationism turned into Trump’s preference for bellicose secessionism understood in terms of potential threats towards "international amity" (Suedfeld, Morrison and Kuznar 2021), being the first and the greatest was tantamount to winning harsh and selfish contests against both domestic and foreign competitors, enemies and parasitic allies, alongside the subversion of political correctness, criminality, immigration, terrorism and internationalism (Herbert, McCrisken and Wroe 2019, 31). Accordingly, Trump’s ‘America First’ predominantly worked as a misplaced strategy of hubris-style, included middle ideological recalcitrance of a bombastic president. Moreover, considering the last days of Trump’s administration marking the insurrectional temper within the American society and the pervasive feelings of insecurity and state of alert, prospects for further radicalization (Norris and Inglehart 2019) and international moods towards dealing with political matters in line with autocratic methods (Heydarian 2020) have to be met cautiously and still haunt the new Biden administration.

The most consistent strategic ostentation of Trumpology is related to advertising the Trump name. It started with the former president’s early pre-political ascension in the 1980s, as an assiduous exercise of branding his own name (Trump 2015). Later on, confronting bankruptcy in the 1990s and defying any ideological ambition and circumspection, Trump went so far as to sell his name to various consuming items (Kellner 2016, 14); eventually, Trump’s overzealous and self-magnifying media entrepreneurship culminated with the Trump-brand reality-TV show The Apprentice between 2004 and 2017 (Fuchs 2018, 184-190). Pushing the brand of his name to the limit through the use of media commercialism grounded on profits, advertising and entertainment (Pickard 2018), businessman Trump built his public fame through essentially flamboyant and carnivalesque-like scenarios. Deeply entrenched in the blueprint of Trumpology, the promo-style of the former president massively appealed to media-based publicity, reality-show politics and targeted political campaigning with a view to inculcate a certain mythology of success, highlight a narcissistic commodification of the self and shape perceptions in regard to a certain type of leader-manager (Fuchs 2018).

In addition, the first "Facebook president" (Halpern 2017) fought his battles on grass-roots social media in order to authenticate a new pattern of conversational exchanges, and deliberately eschewed channels of conventional media communication in order to induce a leader-of-the-people perception, as an empathic, trustworthy and available partner. With these tactics, included middle Trumpology aptly alienated political elites and governmental bureaucracy, and ably deceived popular audiences. Moreover, in the same way in which certain breaching businesses strategically disturb daylight business arrangements (Herbert, McCrisken and Wroe 2019, 18), included middle Trumpology disregarded and transgressed traditional media reporting and polling measurements, replacing them with alternative information channels, by the use of Cambridge Analytica, Google and Facebook (Pybus 2019). In most cases, President Trump seemed to take an upper-hand approach to message transmission, paid little or no consideration to his advisory staff, and mostly professed fact-free and quarrelsome allegations towards everybody. Ultimately, Donald Trump tailored his political speeches as self-centered narratives, self-promotion marketing and self-aggrandizing rhetoric; all things considered, strategic Trumpology served the purposes of a megalomaniac mind. His flawed personalistic strategy is plainly visible in egomaniacal branding books concocted by ghost-writers, in statements such as "you can’t be imaginative or entrepreneurial if you’ve got too much structure" (Trump 1987, 1) and "I like to work in broad strokes, deal with the big picture, but not the details" (Trump 2006, xii). Tocqueville’s ruminations on the American self-interest well understood have a messy recourse in Trump’s selfish, rough and ultimately boastful personalism (Lebow 2018, 27). Typically, his seemingly lack of tact and courtesy, petulant vocabulary and unmannerly conduct scandalized some of his former collaborators and friends; for instance, the ghost-writer of The Art of the Deal, Tony Schwartz, reprimanded Trumpology altogether and regretted his erroneous assessment of Trump’s true personality (Robin 2018, 246).

Coda. The schismatic populist president

Contrary to their expectations and stratagems, populist leaders are not the most popular politicians. As the term populism is indicative of, populists aim to capitalize on the most diffuse concerns of the people, manipulating their deep-seated emotions and transgressing sordid ideological constrictions. For these reasons, populism is simultaneously a super-ideology and no ideology at all; either way, populist tribulations question the very rationality of ideological commitments by postulating their ineffectiveness and unresponsiveness to momentary grievances of the people. Populisms surpass ideological distinctions and rational choices with a view to embrace an overall muddled perspective on ideological nuances, inflict a general emotional attitude through oversimplifications of ideological intricacies, and indulge in compelling activism in regard to critical issues at hand. Taking advantage of crude emotions and diffuse grief of the people, populist leadership adopts an essentially adamant and uncompromising outlook, stirring anxieties, alienating peers, and breaking with commonsensical judgments and conventional resolutions of political matters. Populism eventually turns unpopular for rebuking inclusive middle strategies of political and ideological management and for taking on dichotomy-like, pugnaciously-oriented and melodramatically-performed included middle maneuvers.

Not substantially anti-democratic (Nau 2021), populism perverts the sovereignty of the people fundamental: while traditional theories of popular sovereignty identify the power of the people principle with democratic mechanisms of negotiation, compromise, pluralism and consensus as coextensive to robust self-determination, the populist approach to sovereignty dismantles the above-mentioned liberal and democratic indicators of popular sovereignty and transfers the abstract and inconclusive sources and resources of people’s power into the hands of a charismatic, strong-willed and ultimately authoritarian leader. This basic modus operandi of neo-sovereigntism (Spiro 2000) volatilizes the people’s capacities of executing and controlling power and makes room for noxious practices of dividing the people into factions, antagonizing groups and individuals, and ultimately pulverizing routines of sound rationality into a kind of confusing ambience and pervasive disorientation. Populist neo-sovereigntists insidiously profit from these breaches and instate an included middle political and ideological environment.

Included middle populist Donald Trump was no exception to this characterization of ideological neo-sovereigntism. It is worth mentioning that populist neo-sovereigntism in Trump remains autarchic in nature insofar as it abandons the US multifold openness to the world, while assertively propelling itself as a peculiar species of competitive authoritarianism. Using power to disadvantage both domestic and international opponents (Mickey, Levitsky and Way 2017), Trump’s included middle populism and neo-sovereigntism transformed politics in such a way that animosity, disturbance and unpredictability became ubiquitous. Furthermore, Donald Trump’s included middle ideological posture seemed to illustrate the seminal lesson taught by C. Wright Mills’ (1956) depiction of the ideological battles characterizing historical development in the United States, in terms of a permanent confrontation for power between economic and political elites, since the former populist president obsessively insisted on restoring American big businesses at home and defending the dignity of purportedly patriotic plutocrats, to the detriment of feeble domestic bureaucrats and internationalist traitors. As an included middle neo-sovereigntist, self-proclaiming "authority and autonomy over [his] own polity and others’ polities" (Legro 2015, 19), Donald Trump demonstrated strong abilities towards dismantling liberal institutionalism and democratic processes in regard to peaceful coexistence of conflicting interests, acceptance of opposition, accountability to public scrutiny and party loyalty. As a populist and nativist demagogue, Donald Trump was the historical progeny of Andrew Jackson; as an autocratic sovereigntist, he utterly amplified and distorted George Washington’s Farewell Address rhetoric on petty isolationism and egotistic commercialism.

Through their permanent inclination towards confrontationalism and polarization, populist leaders aim to fragment the polity and ignite rioting mobilization to consolidate their fundamental base (Müller 2016; Hall 2021), while simultaneously professing a void rhetoric about people’s right to rule, of no practical value whatsoever (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 4). Trump’s included middle populism recapitulates certain irrational leanings of populist leaders. Enticing passions and favoring erratic political arrangements, the populist leadership of Donald Trump was dismissive of well-balanced decision-making procedures and stable institutions of constitutional government. Much of his propensity towards action unveiled amoralism, truth-free ratiocination, tribalism and lack of civility, reasons for which one could claim that Donald Trump did not rise to the presidential dignity of constitutional statesmen (Saldin and Teles 2020, 174-176). The specificities of Trump’s included middle populism were augmented by a series of adversarial pairs: the American people versus the corrupt bureaucracy, the American working class versus treasonous outsourcing and immigrants, American power and prosperity versus international obligations, and American traditional values versus political correctness and melting-pot inclusiveness (Sable and Torres 2018, 14).

Trumpism – with its belligerent behavior and discourse of pure people against the political establishment (Weyland and Madrid 2019), Trumponomics – with its assertive macroeconomic views and embedded ‘disregard for basic economic equilibria’ (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991), and Trumpology – with its strategy of narcissistic and populist leadership (Weyland 2001) contribute to explaining Donald Trump’s authoritarian, egoistic and psychotic included middle ideological forays. Understood as complementary facets of a peculiar ideological positioning, Donald Trump’s included middle approach to politics used Trumpology as its creed, Trumpism as its crusade and Trumponomics as its glory.

At the staircase of Air Force One, before leaving Washington DC on January 20, ex-president Trump mysteriously stated that "we’ll be back somehow", announcing his intention of resuming the unfinished project of included middle ideological approach to politics. In full repudiation of presidential courtesy and etiquette in regard to transfer of power, dismissing accusations of unbecoming conduct in administration, and facing a congressional investigation of the insurrectional end of his term, President Trump exited the scene in the same spirit he had committed himself to it, taking on the included middle disruptive, hostile and self-assured mannerism. Are these sufficient reasons to prognosticate a return with a vengeance?

 

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