Márton Tőke is a PhD student at the Institute of English and American Studies, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. His main fields of interest include 20th-century conservative political philosophy, Western intellectual history, and political revolutions.

KUPCHAN, Charles A. Isolationism – A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself From the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Never before has a single power been in such a peculiar situation as the United States from a geostrategic – let alone a political – standpoint. An immense territory, conquered and settled from coast to coast in the span of less than two centuries, neighbors that have not represented a credible threat for at least half of that period – a strategic planner’s idea of a perfect state of affairs. However, the technological penetration during and especially after the Second World War, the economic and thus political interests of the country in an increasingly globalized century, and the realities of an ever-narrowing stage of international politics thoroughly upset this supposedly ideal situation. A number of serious dilemmas follow from this: the necessity of choice between action or refrainment, often dictated not by maps but by ledgers; the necessity of drawing the clear boundaries of ethical considerations, the transgressions of which would prompt intervention; and choosing friends and foes – and the depth and perseverance of such relationships – in the process of engagement, or isolation.

Naturally, these questions are of great importance to students as well as practitioners of international relations both in the United States and around the world. A recent attempt to resolve them was carried out by Charles A. Kupchan, a senior fellow at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Kupchan has written a historically concise account on the subject, albeit with a somewhat questionable conclusion. The book is divided into three main parts, after an introductory musing on the history of the term “isolationism”, reflect the historical boundaries quite well. Part I deals with the period between 1789 and 1898 (“The Era of Isolationism”), Part II – easily of the highest quality of the three – captures the troublesome years between 1898 and 1941 (“The Defeat of Realist and Idealist Internationalism”), while Part III (“The Rise and Fall of Liberal Internationalism”) concludes the book with an overview of the period from 1941 to the present, with an attempt to assess the current state of isolationism as a political idea and as a political practice.

In the Introduction, Kupchan strives to provide an overview of the intellectual history of the term “isolationism”, in a style resembling Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history. He uses an extensive array of sources, seamlessly bringing together the strategic thinking of Henry VIII, the pressures on the Tokugawa shogunate, or Whig debates on splendid isolation. He also devotes a great deal of attention to the natural security aspects of isolationism, citing Thomas Paine and many of the Founding Fathers, highlighting how great a role the debates on diplomacy and international relations in general and isolationism in particular have played in the new nation’s political future. There are six, so-called logics (to be understood as modes of operation) that Kupchan identifies from the start which he considers to be the organizing principles around the ebbs and flows in the history of American isolationism: the beneficial role of isolation in national security, the promotion and consolidation of the newly gained liberties and the emergent prosperity, the ability to act abroad, the maintenance of a homogeneous society, and the promotion of pacifism. This is not a methodological novelty, but a set of criteria that aims at achieving a general “formula” for analyzing isolationism in the United States.

As mentioned, Part I of the book deals more or less with the 19th century, the era of true American isolationism. Kupchan’s book goes far beyond dully repeating the simple narrative triad of foundation-expansion-Monroe Doctrine. He dives deep into the early history of attempts (not) to project American power – at least to some extent – globally, and the multifaceted debates around the hemispheric role of the country, placing it within the context of the ever-deepening divide between Northern and Southern states throughout the first half of the century. He highlights how tempting it was for the US to engage in foreign affairs for short-term gains, and correctly identifies the social as well as the diplomatic factors that lead American leaders to refrain from such actions – despite the three main targets of possible US engagement (the Pacific, the Caribbean, and Latin America) being so lucrative.

The Civil War naturally put a hold on all dreams of expansion beyond what the US perceived to be its own home base. The most valuable contribution of Kupchan to the subject is highlighting the intriguing interplay between how the North and the South utilized diplomacy during the war. Whereas the Union refrained from seeking any form of assistance or alliance from foreign powers, the South, due to its more conservative stance, approached the British crown and France, albeit largely unsuccessfully, as both of them remained neutral parties. Kupchan’s use of sources is quite commendable throughout the whole volume, both on the level of primary sources, as he relies on less frequently cited sources, and on that of secondary sources, as he presents diverging views on historical subjects. The failed attempts at Caribbean expansion during reconstruction and the lead-up to the Spanish-American War, the first serious clash between the United States and an Old World Power since 1812, are also recapitulated well.

Part II, the section dealing with the period between the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the first American boots on the ground in 1941, is without doubt the most well-constructed and engaging portion of Kupchan’s work. He masterfully presents the narrative of the interdependent philosophies of realist and idealist internationalism. The failure of the former as the public recoiled disheartened from the cold, calculating manner in which expansion after the victory in the Spanish-American was handled, and the failure of the latter, as Wilson’s blind idealism came to a screeching halt in the halls of a Congress that rejected participation in the League of Nations, are rightfully presented as the perfect precursor for the rest of the century. As a complement to the narrative, Kupchan correctly analyzes the geopolitical and the deeper historical reasons why the United States as it is today will never again be able to return to its continental isolation, and correctly claims that from the moment Japanese warplanes hit Pearl Harbor, it was the level of engagement, not its very existence that was to differentiate between more refraining and more engaging viewpoints.

However, it is precisely for these positive attributes that the last part of the book, especially its second half, comes as somewhat of a disappointment to its readers. Although the historical narrative presented is more or less of the same quality as the book’s previous chapters, presenting the postwar and Cold War eras, things start to go south rapidly after the author reaches the fall of the Soviet Union. From that point on, it is hard to interpret the text as anything other than a haphazard love letter to the Democratic Party and the two presidents they gave to the country between 1989 and 2020. The formerly cool and objective voice of the author – who was nonetheless clearly favoring international engagement rather than isolation, as he acknowledged at many instances, which is of course not a problem on its own – disappears. It is replaced by mocking harshness towards all who do not argue for total internationalism and unquestioning engagement. His mostly unfunded and clearly ideologically driven claims about the Trump presidency would be especially outrageous, had the entire political and entertainment media industry not been repeating it constantly for four long years.

Despite the many positive traits of the book, the last part leaves a bitter taste in the mouth of a reader who was looking for if not an apolitical, but at least a not obviously biased historical account. Policy suggestions are not evil, they form a separate genre, but they have no place thrown as a sort of after-thought at the end of an academic study, especially if their quality is only a smidge beyond the general mainstream talking points of cable news media pundits. Kupchan’s thinking and rhetoric is far from being tainted by critical theory, or the many pitfalls of overtly-politicized history writing so penetrating these days, but the author is showcasing his biases while not acknowledging the one-sidedness of his final argumentation in this last, more prescriptive part of his work. Quite unfortunate, especially considering that the rest of the book is of high quality, argued with sound, if not brilliant, reasoning, and the extent of its sources are admirable.

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